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In the long run we will all be dead, thus accounting for a com-
mon proclivity to focus on the short run. We must, however, guard 
against the tendency to view present conditions as eternal. So long as 
we live in a dual sovereignty consisting of federal and state govern-
ments, the tension between state and federal power can never be re-
solved in any definitive manner. At best, some sort of temporary bal-
ance must be struck, and the demarcation line of that balance swings 
to and fro like a pendulum. One purpose in adopting the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights was to put in place a system whereby their 
meaning would be embodied in the shifting outcome of the continuing 
struggle between various decision makers. 
Although this symposium appropriately focuses on current condi-
tions, it behooves us to remember the words of the 81-year-old Ben-
jamin Franklin when urging the adoption of our Constitution: 
I confess that there are several parts of this constitution which I do not at 
present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them: For having 
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lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better 
information or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important 
subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise ... 1 
Following Franklin's example, this essay takes a protracted view 
of the federalization of criminal procedure. It is important to review 
how the federalism pendulum has swung over the years to reflect con-
cepts of what the Constitution was meant to mean, what it has come to 
mean, and what it ought to mean. 
II. IN THE BEGINNING 
Federalism is identifying the rules of the game under which the 
process of decision-making and exercise of government power will 
proceed. By adopting a constitution and a bill of rights, a political 
community defines its boundaries and establishes the system from 
which legitimate outcomes derive. It is not surprising then that the 
debate over ratification of the Bill of Rights focused on "what kind of 
government Americans wanted, not what rights this government should 
protect. "2 
In the beginning were the states, whose constitutions provided the 
model for the federal Bill of Rights. "[T]he drafters of the federal Bill 
of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the various state 
constitutions,"3 and James Madison undertook a comprehensive com-
parison of the provisions of state constitutions with those of the federal 
Constitution. 4 A federal Bill of Rights patterned on state provisions 
was the mandatory price federalists paid to gain support from anti-
federalists who :feared the potential tyranny of a strong central govern-
ment. 
1. Sol Wachtfor, Our Constitutions - Alive and Well, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 381, 
381 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter Wachtler] (quoting 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 641-43 (1966)). 
2. Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
115, 117 (1992) (addressing the plenary session at the Conference for the Federal Judiciary 
in Honor of the Bicentennial of the Bill of Rights (Oct. 21, 1991)). 
3. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 501 (1977). 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 323 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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In light of their perceived oppression at the hands of the English 
monarchy, anti-federalists and many other Americans in the 1780s 
associated a strong central government with tyranny and a strong state 
government with freedom. Individual freedom could be protected not 
only by the local legislature, but by the local courts as well. Although 
twentieth century lawyers rush to constitutionalize and codify criminal 
procedure, antebellum lawyers did not start their analysis with the 
Constitution or latest Supreme Court decision. 5 The grand tradition in 
the states was common law decision-making: reasoning by analogy 
from established precedent. The Constitution, Declaration of Indepen-
dence, Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and similar manifestos 
of human rights could be seen as merely declaratory of rights already 
in existence and subject to protection by common law. 6 In short, the 
framers saw no need to extend the Bill of Rights to the states because 
the states were seen as protectors of, rather than threats to, individual 
rights. Such at least was the conventional wisdom which led Chief 
Justice Marshall to declare that the Bill of Rights "is intended solely as 
a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United 
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the states."7 
In the beginning and for the first one hundred years of the 
nation's existence, the federalism pendulum was motionless, serving as 
a fixed demarcation line dividing two separate spheres within which 
each government regulated its criminal justice system independently of 
the other. The Bill of Rights limited the powers of the federal gov-
ernment, while individual state constitutions regulated the use of state 
power. The Fourteenth Amendment would end this equilibrium and set 
the pendulum in motion. 
5. It was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court forged "a national human rights 
law and new legal framework for society, with the federal Constitution and the Supreme 
Court at its center." Judith S. Kaye, Forward: The Common Law and State Constitutional 
Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L. J. 727, 736 
(1992). 
6. Id. See also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITIJTIONALISM 117 (1993) (explaining that constitutionalism was a tradition of common 
law reasoning rather than of political theorizing). 
7. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243, 250-51 (1833). 
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III. DUE PROCESS AND INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The institution of slavery demonstrated that the states could not be 
trusted to safeguard the liberty of all citizens. Slavery and the repres-
sion that it bred was almost exclusively a creature of state law. Efforts 
to preserve slavery 
led slave states to violate virtually every "right" and "freedom" declared in 
the Bill - not just rights and freedoms of slaves, but of free men and 
women too. Simply put, slavery required repression. Speech and writing 
critical of slavery - even if plainly religious or political in inspiration -
was incendiary and had to be suppressed in Southern states, lest slaves 
overhear and get ideas.8 
In the aftermath of the Civil War the former confederate states 
could not be trusted to respect individual rights of the newly freed 
slaves. When state government was seen as a threat to, not as a protec-
tor of individual rights, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted as a 
powerful brake on runaway state government. The Amendment mandat-
ed that no state may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law."9 
With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme 
Court embarked upon the "incorporation" debate over a number of 
integrated questions. Does the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the 
Bill of Rights, making the Bill's restrictions on federal power applica-
ble against the states? Are only some of the provisions of the first ten 
amendments incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment? Is the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of due process independent of the Bill of 
Rights and thus a "blank check" to be filled in by the judiciary?10 In 
the area of criminal procedure the Supreme Court would not confront 
these issues until the early twentieth century and would not resolve 
many of the questions until the heyday of the Warren Court. 
8. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 
1193, 1216 (1992) (citations omitted). 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
10. Due process is "the least frozen concept of our law - the least confined to histo-
1)' and the most absorptive of powerful social standards of a progressive society." Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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In the decade preceding the Warren Court, Justice Frankfurter was 
the leading proponent of the view that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
did not mean to imprison the States into the limited experience of the 
eighteenth century,"11 thus the amendment incorporated none of the 
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Instead, "the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment expresses a demand for civilized 
standards which are not defined by the specifically enumerated guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights . . . due process of law has its own indepen-
dent function."12 In two dramatic cases, Justice Frankfurter instructed 
the Court as to how to identify the civilized standards embodied within 
due process. 
In Louisiana ex r.el. Francis, 13 Frankfurter provided the crucial 
vote and authored a concurring opinion for an otherwise equally divid-
ed Court. The defendant in Francis had been placed in the electric 
chair and the executioner threw the switch, but because of some me-
chanical difficulty, death did not result. 14 The defendant was removed 
from the electric chair, returned to prison and rescheduled for execu-
tion. 15 The defendant then claimed that a second attempt at execution 
would violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopar-
dy and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.16 
Four Justices assumed, but did not decide, that the Fifth and 
Eighth Amendments were incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause and thereby made applicable to 
Louisiana.17 Nonetheless, these Justices found no constitutional viola-
tion because the state did not intend to be cruel, nor did the state plan 
to torture Francis. 18 The Justices lamented the unfortunate circum-
stances of the case, but suggested that "[a]ccidents happen for which 
11. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947). 
12. Id. 
13. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). 
14. Id. at 460. 
15. Id. at 461. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 462-64. 
18. Francis, 329 U.S. at 464. 
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no man is to blame."19 The four dissenters, however, insisted that 
"[t]he intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or excuse the 
result,"20 and that this "death by installments" was cruel and unusual 
punishment. 21 
Frankfurter expressed his "personal feeling of revulsion against a 
State's insistence on its pound of flesh," and conceded that he was 
"[s]trongly drawn" to some of the sentiments expressed by the dis-
sent.22 He felt compelled, however, to put aside personal feelings be-
cause "great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this 
Court."23 For Frankfurter, the Due Process Clause entitled the Court 
to rein in a state acting "in a manner that violates standards of decency 
more or less universally accepted though not when it treats him by a 
mode about which opinion is fairly divided."24 Presumably, a four to 
four vote by the other members of the Court was a paradigm of fair 
division, thus causing Frankfurter to defer to the state's judgment. 
Five years after the Francis decision, however, Frankfurter would 
find a clear violation of due process even though Justice Douglas in-
formed him that opinion on the matter was not fairly divided, in fact 
the vast majority of the states approved what Frankfurter now con-
demned. In Rochin v. California25 the police illegally forced their way 
into Rochin's bedroom where they saw him seize two capsules from a 
night stand and put them in his mouth. Three officers ''jumped upon 
him" and unsuccessfully attempted to extract the capsules.26 Rochin 
was handcuffed and taken to a hospital where a doctor forced an emet-
ic solution through a tube into Rochin's stomach.27 This "stomach 
pumping" produced vomiting, and two capsules containing morphine 
were found in the vomited matter. 28 
19. Id. at 462. 
20. Id. at 477 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 472-81 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
22. Id. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
23. Francis, 329 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
24. Id. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
25. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
26. Id. at 166. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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Frankfurter again paid homage to judicial restraint and the Court's 
duty to "'exercise with due humility our merely negative function in 
subjecting convictions from state courts to the very narrow scrutiny 
which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment authoriz-
es. "'29 That narrow scrutiny required the Court to give the states free 
rein so long as convictions were not "brought about by methods that 
offend 'a sense of justice.'"30 In an eloquent passage, Frankfurter ex-
plained why the state had violated standards of fundamental justice: 
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than 
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about com-
batting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. 
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open 
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his 
stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by agents of government 
to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are 
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional 
differentiation.31 
In Frankfurter's talented hands due process was flexible enough to 
sanction "execution by installments" while condemning the rudeness 
with which the police forced a defendant to vomit. The Warren Court 
would both disdain Frankfurter's approach and utilize it in slightly 
different form. 
IV. THE WARREN COURT 
Frankfurter had swung the federalism pendulum toward the posi-
tion that the Due Process Clause incorporated none of the specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Instead, each particular case had to be 
examined to determine whether the right alleged is one implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty. Frankfurter's chief antagonist on the Court 
was Justice Black, who sought to swing the pendulum from no incor-
poration to total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. In Rochin, Black 
argued that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states and that 
29. Id. at 168 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 412, 418 (1945)). 
30. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173. 
31. Id. at 172. 
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California had violated the Amendment by forcibly taking incriminating 
evidence from the defendant.32 Black derided Frankfurter's "nebulous 
standards" of civilized justice as a chancellor's foot veto over law en-
forcement practices of which the Court did not approve. 33 Black main-
tained that total incorporation provided the content of due process and 
more importantly "keeps judges from roaming at will in their own 
notions of what policies outside the Bill of Rights are desirable and 
what are not. "34 
Had either Black's total incorporation or Frankfurter's no incorpo-
ration approach been adopted by the full Court, that aspect of the fed-
eralism pendulum would have been frozen in place. The Court, howev-
er, ultimately adopted a process of selective incorporation,35 thereby 
insuring some elbow room for future movement should the pendulum 
need to be adjusted to accommodate additional rights found to be em-
bodied in due process. 
Although the incorporation debate was a major focus of the War-
ren Court, it is not the defining characteristic of the Court's approach 
to the federalization of criminal procedure. In the long run, the concept 
of total, selective, or no incorporation, proved to be little more than 
different verbal formulae used to achieve the same results. Because 
most language in the Bill of Rights is as general and nebulous as is 
the phrase "due process," dwelling on the literal language of the Bill 
of Rights simply shifts the focus of broad judicial inquiry from "due 
process" to such equally general terms as "unreasonable searches." 
Consider Schmerber v. Californid6 where the state extracted a 
blood sample from an unconscious defendant suspected of drunk driv-
ing. The Supreme Court ruled: (1) extraction of the blood did not 
offend that sense of justice spoken of in Rochin;31 (2) the privilege 
32. Id. at 174-77 (Black, J., concurring). 
33. Id. 
34. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). 
35. The Court picks and chooses those rights it considers "'of the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty."' William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The 
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 
538 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan] (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)). 
36. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
37. Id. at 771. 
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against self-incrimination, now binding on the states, only protected 
"evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature," which the blood 
sample was not;38 and (3) the protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure, also now binding on the states, was satisfied because the 
procedures used to take the blood were constitutionally "reasonable."39 
In Schmerber, testing the state's exercise of power under the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments produced the same result.40 
At the other end of the spectrum, Winston v. Lee41 demonstrated 
that substantive due process retains some vitality. In Winston, the po-
lice sought a court order requiring a robbery suspect to undergo sur-
gery for removal of a bullet lodged in his shoulder, in hopes that a 
ballistics test would link the bullet to the victim's gun.42 The defen-
dant maintained that compulsory surgery would violate his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 43 
The Supreme Court conceded that by seeking a court order based on 
probable cause, the state had complied with the procedural require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment.44 This determination might have dis-
posed of the case in light of the Court's earlier suggestions that no 
area of individual privacy was beyond the reach of a procedurally 
proper warrant.45 Nonetheless, the Court barred state ordered surgery 
because it would violate the Fourth Amendment's substantive require-
ment of reasonableness; a requirement unrelated to the amendment's 
procedural requirements.46 The effect of Winston was that although all 
of the procedures of the Fourth Amendment warrant clause might be 
satisfied, a search could still be invalidated because of the substantive 
right of privacy embodied in the amendment's reasonableness clause. 47 
38. Id. at 761. 
39. Id. at 771. 
40. See also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 (1980) (holding that the 
relevant interests do not change when a court analyzes police misconduct under the Fourth 
Amendment, Due Process Clause, or the court's supervisory power). 
41. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). 
42. Id. at 756. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 763. 
45. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
46. Winston, 470 U.S. at 767. 
47. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth 
780 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:771 
Winston's protection of substantive privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment's rubric of reasonableness sounds very much like substan-
tive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, much of 
the language in Winston echoes the due process language of Rochin.48 
Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice Brennan indicated that the state had 
shocked the Court's collective conscience: 
[T]he Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to 
"drug this citizen - not yet convicted of a criminal offense - with nar-
cotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness," . . . and then to 
search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime.49 
Due process and similarly sweeping concepts of unreasonable 
searches and seizures have proved to be equally facile tools for assess-
ing the constitutional propriety of state law enforcement practices. Thus 
the great incorporation debate has ended (or limps along) with a mere 
whimper. In the long run, the most significant feature of the Warren 
Court was not the controversy over whether to employ no, total, or 
selective incorporation as the tool for reviewing state law enforcement 
practices. The defining characteristic of the Warren Court was its will-
ingness to push the federalism pendulum to increase federal review of 
the previously neglected area of pretrial police procedures. 
In the 1950s and '60s the Warren Court faced a serious discrepan-
cy between legal theory and the reality of modern law enforcement. 
On paper, the Bill of Rights and state constitutions enumerated the 
individual's protections against government power, but "at night on the 
streets, and in the darker corners of station-houses, lawlessness was 
more of a reality than constitutional delicacy."50 The "third-degree" 
and other questionable police tactics (if not actual police brutality) 
increasingly came to the Court's attention. Professor Kamisar graphical-
Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 597 (1986). 
48. The lower court in Winston concluded that the proposed surgery was "condemned 
by Rochin." Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983). 
49. Winston, 470 U.S. at 765 (quoting Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 901 (4th Cir. 
1983) (citations omitted)). 
50. Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nine-
teenth Century, 53 ALB. L. REv. 265, 275 (1989) [hereinafter Friedman]. 
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ly portrayed the courtroom as the showcase "mansion" of criminal pro-
cedure while the police station was a lowly "gatehouse": 
The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow 
and strut and prosecuting attorneys are hemmed in at many turns. But 
what happens before an accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort 
of this veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub. Typically he must first pass 
through a much less pretentious edifice, a police station with bare back 
rooms and locked doors. 
In this "gatehouse" of American criminal procedure . . . the enemy 
of the state is a depersonalized "subject" to be "sized up" and subjected to 
"interrogation tactics and techniques most appropriate for the occasion;" he 
is "game" to be stalked and cornered. Here, ideals are checked at the 
door, "realities" faced, and the prestige of law enforcement vindicated.51 
Professor Kamisar queried "why the Constitution requires so much 
in the courtroom and means so little in the police station. "52 The 
Warren Court would answer that query by examining entrenched police 
practices and subjecting them to constitutional scrutiny. 
At the heart of the Warren Court's approach to criminal procedure 
was the belief that the states could not be trusted to protect the rights 
of criminal defendants. 53 This belief was triggered by a shift in popu-
lar perceptions about government power.54 In the eighteenth century, 
fear of an overbearing and oppressive government was a pervasive 
influence on the original Bill of Rights, but by the twentieth century 
fear of tyranny was replaced by fear of the criminal. 55 In response to 
this widespread fear the police and the state courts adopted a "get 
tough on crime" stance as the criminal justice system increasingly 
focused on ways to control and eliminate crime, rather than on ways to 
51. Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Crimi-
nal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, From Escobedo to . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
OUR TIME 3, 19-20 (1965). 
52. Id. at 21. 
53. In the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Harlan expressed dissatisfac-
tion with many state courts' discharge of their "front-line responsibility for the enforcement 
of constitutional rights." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). 
54. The 0. J. Simpson trial in general, and the detective Fuhrman tapes in particular, 
may alter the public perception of controlling police power. 
55. Friedman, supra note 50, at 272. 
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protect the accused. The Warren Court would buck popular consensus 
by swinging the federalism pendulum in favor of extending federal 
constitutional protections to those suspected of criminal activity. Mapp 
v. Ohio,56 which extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to 
the states, and ~Miranda v. Arizona,51 which required the now famous 
warnings, must rank among the most unpopular decisions in Supreme 
Court history. 
In the present day it has become fashionable to characterize the 
Warren Court's constitutionalization of criminal procedure as an un-
democratic exercise of judicial arrogance. Democratic theory, however, 
presumes shifting coalitions where minorities may come together and 
become majorities or at least substantial minorities who can gain the 
ear of the legislature. In practice, criminal defendants find themselves 
permanently in a minority status before the legislature and feared by 
the majority of law abiding citizens. Majoritarian decision-making may 
be generally a good thing, but sometimes it needs correction by the 
courts, particularly when there are reasons to think that some minority 
voices have been unable to be heard fairly. The judicial activism of the 
Warren Court has been defended on grounds that the oppressed can at 
least get into court to argue against their oppression, unlike the diffi-
culties encountered when attempting to mount an effective political 
movement that would similarly argue against their oppression.58 
In the long run, however, the Warren Court's legal or political 
justifications for its activism are less significant than its efforts to in-
ject humane principles into criminal procedure.59 The Court's humani-
tarian approach to criminal procedure is best captured in folklore re-
counting oral arguments before the Warren Court. In a typical case, 
government counsel might defend a police practice by invoking lofty 
jurisprudential arguments, often involving federalism issues. An impa-
tient Chief Justice would interrupt: "Yes, yes. But is it fair?"60 That 
56. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
57. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
58. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
59. "But the Constitution is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not 
to maintain theories."' Rochin, 342 U.S. at 174 (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 
(1904)). 
60. Justice Brennan referred to the Warren era as "a time in which the Court played 
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pithy question embodies all that was good and bad about the Warren 
Court's activism. Less brusque but no less revealing was Chief Justice 
Warren's retirement address where he noted that minorities sometimes 
could look to no one but the judiciary.61 He explained that, "we have 
no constituency. We serve no majority. We serve no minority. We 
serve only the public interest as we see it, guided only by the Consti-
tution and our own consciences. "62 Though one wonders if the words 
stuck in his throat, President Nixon appeared at the retirement ceremo-
ny and praised Warren's fairness and his humanity.63 As an expression 
of humanity and fairness, the Warren Court pushed the federalism 
pendulum to extend federal constitutional protection of individual 
rights. 
V. THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS 
Whether one criticizes or defends the Warren Court's activist bent, 
the federalism pendulum has once again swung, and the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts have engineered a retreat from federal supervision of 
"fundamental fairness." In United States v. Payner,64 the lower court 
held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
inherent supervisory power of the federal courts required it to exclude 
evidence tainted by the Government's 'knowing and purposeful bad 
faith hostility to any person's fundamental constitutional rights."'65 
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this remnant of Frankfurter's 
approach to due process. The Court stated that even if government 
'the role of keeper of the nation's conscience."' Brennan, supra note 35, at 547 (citations 
omitted). The Warren Court reflected a twentieth century phenomenon, an "unspoken norm 
that large power-centers (governmental or otherwise) should act fairly, insofar as they make 
major impacts on people's lives." Friedman, supra note 50, at 274. 
61. Retirement of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 395 U.S. vii, xi (1969). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at viii. President Nixon employed a Will Rogers quote to describe Chief Jus-
tice Warren - "It is great to be great It is greater to be human." Id. 
64. 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
65. Id. at 731 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 129 (1977)). The 
District Court found that "'the Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth 
Amendment standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional 
search and seizure of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third parties . . . . "' 
Id. at 730 (quoting Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 132-33). 
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conduct is so outrageous as to offend fundamental "canons of decency 
and fairness" according to Rochin, "the fact remains that '[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause . . . come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some protected right of the 
defendant. "'66 In the absence of a specific violation of the particular 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the overall propriety of the 
government's search and seizure activity was no longer subject to re-
view under the Due Process Clause. 
In addition to discounting the majestic generalities of Due Process, 
the Burger Court resurrected faith in the states as protectors of indi-
vidual freedom. Stone v. Powel/61 rejected any argument that the War-
ren Court's expansion of federal power had been justified by the state 
courts' hostility to the Bill of Rights: 
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic 
attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, 
we are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appro-
priate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of 
the several States. . . . In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact 
that a man is a federal judge should make him more competent, or consci-
entious, or learned with respect to the [consideration of Fourth Amend-
ment claims] than his neighbor in the state courthouse."68 
Stone v. Powell announced that henceforth federal habeas corpus 
would not be used to review Fourth Amendment claims so long as the 
"State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the 
claim. 69 The Court's retreat from habeas review was based on its de-
cision to "forgo the exercise" of this power in the interest of "comity 
and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice"70 and 
to diminish "federal-state friction."71 The dissent, however, turned the 
tables on the m~rjority by characterizing the holding as "a manifestation 
66. Id. at 737 n.9 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169; Hampton v. United States, 425 
U.S. 484, 490 (1976)). 
67. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
68. Id. at 494 n.35 (quoting Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REY. 441, 509 (1963)). 
69. Id. at 494. 
70. Id. at 478 n.11. 
71. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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of this Court's mistrust for federal judges" who might too actively set 
aside state court determinations. 72 
Stone v. Powell was merely the first step in the Supreme Court's 
generally successful efforts to rein in federal judges reared on the War-
ren Court's judicial activism and distrust of state courts. In a dramatic 
turnabout from the perception of the Warren Court as the bulwark 
standing between citizens and state governmental incursions on their 
liberties, there has been an emerging perception that state courts are a 
more hospitable forum than are their federal counterparts for those who 
seek expanded protection of human rights and civil liberties. Today, it 
is the state courts that are expressing dissatisfaction with the Supreme 
Court's role in the enforcement of constitutional rights. 
Unlike other critics of the Supreme Court, state courts have the 
power to do something about their discontent with the current status of 
human rights litigation. As coequal guardians of civil rights and liber-
ties, state courts are free to surpass the minimum guarantees embodied 
in the federal Bill of Rights. Although the Fourteenth Amendment does 
not permit a state to fall below a common national standard, above this 
level, federalism permits diversity. Michigan v. Long73 recognized that 
if a state court plainly declares that its increased protection of individu-
al rights rests on state law, the U. S. Supreme Court will honor that 
statement and will not review the state court decision. 
To its critics, the Warren Court engineered a permanent redistribu-
tion of power from the states to the federal government, thereby sti-
fling federalism's invitation to states to "serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments."74 But a pendulum does not 
allow for "permanent" shifts. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts have 
dismantled the Warren Court's federalization of the criminal justice 
system and once again shifted power back to the states. Michigan v. 
Long marks the path for states to escape federal review and remain the 
72. Powell, 428 U.S. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
73. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
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ultimate arbiters of state law. In the short run, the state laboratories are 
once again open for business. 
Under the new federalism the political forces within each state 
laboratory are free to wield their influence upon the state judiciary. As 
Chief Justice Burger suggested, "when state courts interpret state law to 
require more than the Federal Constitution requires, the citizens of the 
state must be aware that they have the power to amend state law to 
insure rational law enforcement."75 With each new state court deci-
sion, "liberals" presumably will rise to defend or attack the decision, 
while "conservatives" will respond accordingly. Because of popular 
election or retention elections by the legislature, most state court judges 
are subject to greater political accountability than are their federal 
counterparts. Should state judges prove to be unresponsive to political 
pressures, expressions of the popular will can take the form of consti-
tutional amendment, a much less cumbersome process at the state level. 
There is, however, another side to the new federalism which per-
mits state judges to insulate themselves from almost all accountability. 
If so disposed, a state court could base its decision on both indepen-
dent state grounds and upon federal grounds, thereby using each sover-
eign to trump the other. That is, by invoking the state constitution the 
state court insulates its decision from federal judicial review. By simul-
taneously invoking the federal constitution the state court blocks ac-
countability to the state political system. This form of unreviewable 
judicial power is an anathema to the proponents of the new federalism, 
but the jury is still out on whether the Supreme Court will permit state 
judges to manipulate federalism concepts to remove themselves from 
accountability to both federal and state authorities. 
It is too early in the game to make a long run assessment of the 
latest shift in federal/state power or to measure the true colors of the 
new federalism espoused by the Supreme Court. Should the Court lose 
·patience with the results from the state laboratories, the door to experi-
mentation could slam shut. Scarcely twelve years passed between the 
Court's encouragement of federalism and diversity in Wolf v. Colora-
do76, and Mapp v. Ohio11 when the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
75. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
76. 338 U.S. 2:5 (1949). 
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rule was imposed on the states. Only time will tell whether the federal-
ism pendulum will continue in its present direction toward increased 
state power, or whether the inevitable rebound is near at hand. The 
federalization of criminal procedure is governed by changes in society 
and by shifting political winds. Those winds will surely shift again; 
only the timing is in question. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This essay began with a promise to take a protracted view of the 
federalization of criminal procedure. What we gain from a broadened 
perspective is an appreciation of federalism as an ongoing process 
rather than a substantive result that we may or may not favor. Those 
who focus on process can delight in the federalism debate as a means 
of continually participating in a modem-day constitutional convention 
redefining the structure and relationship of our federal and state gov-
emments. 78 
Those who favor results over process may hope to see the federal-
ism debate come to a conclusion after some two hundred years. (Even 
the 0. J. Simpson trial finally ended). It might be comforting to re-
solve this debate if we could believe that the federalism pendulum had 
stopped swinging because it found the exactly correct balancing point 
between federal and state power. However, even assuming that there is 
some exactly correct balancing point, 
we make a serious mistake to accept the belief that the past has done its 
·work for the present, and that our liberty, which is the cornerstone of 
democracy, is guaranteed. The truth is that one generation can never pro-
tect the rights of another, and although all of our great documents: the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, are 
ideal reflections of our finest aspirations, they are not self-fulfilling chari-
ots of justice. For all their beauty, they are only words, dependent on each 
77. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
78. The debate between modem-day Federalists and Anti-federalists is increasingly 
strident Both sides need to remember that federal and state governments "not only peaceful-
ly co-exist, but depend on each other, in varying degrees, to do their work. The essence of 
the relationship is interdependence." Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate 
Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 707, 709 (1983). 
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generation to give them a meaning and content for its own time and 
place.79 
In the long run we will all be dead, but the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights will be given new life by those who follow us and who 
must continue to fine tune the mechanism that controls the federalism 
pendulum. 
79. Wachtler, supra note 1, at 387 (citations omitted). 
